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Introduction 
 
Regional security in the South Caucasus has long been dependent on the difficult balancing of 
outside pressure and internal challenges by the three states of the South Caucasus region -- 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.  For much of the past two centuries, the South Caucasus 
served as an arena for competing empires and has been hostage to the competing interests of 
much more powerful outside regional powers.  Some of those very same historic powers -- 
Russia, Turkey and Iran – continue to exert influence as today’s dominant actors in the region.   
 
But most significantly, this combination of historical legacies and current realities has been 
matched by a recent shift in regional geopolitics.  This shift in geopolitics is comprised of several 
elements, ranging from the challenges of energy security to the constraints from unresolved or 
“frozen” conflicts.  But at the same time, more specific trends, such as Russia’s reassertion of 
power and influence and the August 2008 war in Georgia, have posed the most powerful 
challenges to security and stability in the South Caucasus.  
 
For Armenia, the threats to national security are also expressed on a deeper level, including more 
than new geopolitical changes, but challenges related to Armenia’s struggle with a difficult 
course of economic and political reform, systemic transition and nation-building.  Armenia is 
also burdened by the need to overcome the legacy of constraints from seven decades of Soviet 
rule.  But it is the intersection of broader geopolitical challenges and deeper internal deficiencies 
that defines Armenia as a center in a “region at risk.” 
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I. Redrawing the Regional Map: Implications for Armenia 
 
In many ways, it is now clear that the war in Georgia in August 2008 has redrawn the regional 
map in the South Caucasus. In the wake of that brief but dramatic war, Russia has only enhanced 
its power and influence in this region.  In some ways reflecting this new Russian reassertion of 
power and influence Russia is also improving relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
 
The Russian-Turkish Embrace 
 
Although the recent improvement in Russia’s relations with Turkey has been marked by a warm 
embrace between Moscow and Ankara, it is based on short-term considerations of the energy 
interests of both states and the new anti-Americanism within Turkey, which drives each country 
closer together.  But the convergence of Russian and Turkish interests is limited over the longer-
term by virtue of the fact that both countries are natural rivals in the region.  
 
From an Armenian perspective, however, there is growing concern over this Russian-Turkish 
embrace, especially as Moscow seems intent on influencing the current state of Turkish-
Armenian relations.  Although Russian support for Armenian-Turkish diplomatic negotiations 
represents an important positive shift, it is largely due to the fact that is it is now in Russia’s 
interest to maximize the Turkish-Armenian border opening for its own purposes.  
 
More specifically, although Russian policy has long been opposed to any significant 
improvement in relations between Armenia and Turkey and the closed border was seen as a 
helpful way to maintaining Russian dominance over Armenia, Russia’s position has shifted 
dramatically recently.  Moscow’s stance has shifted most clearly in the wake of Russia’s August 
war with Georgia, with a possible Armenian-Turkish rapprochement only serving to bolster the 
Russian strategy to more completely isolate, marginalize and surround Georgia.   
 
Nevertheless, Russia will only remain supportive so long as the future course of Armenian-
Turkish relations remains under its control.  There are also added benefits for Russia from the 
issue, such as the possible sale of electricity to eastern Turkey from the Russian-owned energy 
network in Armenia.  There was also a diplomatic coup by Moscow, as the Armenian invitation 
was made during an official visit to Moscow and coordinated closely with Russian officials. 
 
The Five-Day Russian-Georgian War 
 
With a ceasefire agreement signed on 13 August 2008, the brief five-day conflict between 
Georgian and Russian forces effectively ended.  But in the aftermath of the war, Russian troops 
were not only able to significantly strengthen their positions within Georgia proper, nut also 
threatened to permanently dismember the Georgian state, as Moscow’s decision to formally 
recognize the independence of Georgia’s two separatists regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
now makes any future attempt at Georgian territorial reintegration extremely difficult.  
 
Although the relatively brief duration of open hostilities now seem to have ended, the campaign 
has significantly decimated Georgian military capabilities and has effectively ended both 
Georgia’s long-time aspirations for NATO membership and its hopes to retake its two break-
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away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Although the initial Georgian offensive seems to 
have been triggered by a series of provocations, the Georgian military strategy was significantly 
flawed from the start, based on an underestimation of the Russian response and an 
overestimation of its own military capabilities. 
 
Moreover, the Russian military campaign in Georgia was both rapid and overwhelming and, as 
the first military offensive beyond Russia’ borders since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it 
was largely unexpected.  The Russian campaign moved well beyond the objectives of securing 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and pushed through to secure a perimeter security zone within 
Georgia proper.  An essential element of this plan was to decimate fundamental Georgian 
military capabilities by pursuing retreating Georgian units, destroying as much heavy equipment 
as possible and by specifically targeting all Georgian military facilities and bases, even those not 
involved in the conflict, in order to almost completely degrade Georgia’s military capabilities. 
 
Thus, due to the combination of fundamental tactical shortcomings and serious strategic blunders 
in the Georgian campaign to retake South Ossetia, it seems clear that the flaws in Georgian 
military planning were based on two key factors: an over-confident assumption of its own 
combat readiness and capabilities, as well as by a serious under-estimation of the scale and scope 
of the Russian response.  On a broader level, the war with Georgia offered Russia an important 
opportunity to regain its leverage over the region, an opportunity that virtually remade the map 
of the South Caucasus and to redefined the parameters of the region’s strategic landscape.   
 
From the Russian perspective, the new regional reality was marked by three distinct 
achievements: first, an abrupt end to NATO expansion in the South Caucasus, at least for the 
near-term; second, the demise of Georgian capabilities to fulfill its ambitions as a fully fledged 
Western anchor in the region; and third, a serious spike in broader tension and looming 
confrontation with the West as a whole.  Russia was also able to reaffirm the inherent energy 
insecurity of the South Caucasus, demonstrating the vulnerability of the region’s pipelines and 
ports and raising new doubts over the reliability of Georgia as a key transit state.  Interestingly, 
this lesson was also one of the most important concerns for both Turkey and Azerbaijan.  In 
terms of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey energy chain, both Ankara and Baku were angered at 
what they interpreted as a Georgian blunder that portrayed them as weak and vulnerable.   
 
The Warming of Russian-Azerbaijani Relations 
 
For Armenia, the most important implication from recent changes within the Russian leadership 
stems from the possible shift or modification to Moscow’s policies in the “Near Abroad.”  
Although Armenia is already very much hostage to the broader course of Russian ambition and 
interest, changes in Russian policies in the region in general, and toward Azerbaijan more 
specifically, pose a serious threat to the security of both Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh. 
 
For much of the past decade and a half, Armenia has remained ever firmly locked in the Russian 
orbit, with little or no tension between the two states.  Over the past decade, the Russian position 
has only strengthened in Armenia, despite a parallel decline in Russian power and presence in 
the rest of the region.  The overall trend in Russian relations with Armenia is consistent, 
however, and remains firmly rooted in the stability of a strategic relationship between the two 
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countries.  Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus region to openly host a Russian 
military base on its territory, and both sides seem content to maintain this relationship.  But at the 
same time, Moscow’s policies toward Yerevan actually weaken Armenian national security. 
 
By its very nature, the strategic relationship between Armenia and Russia is rooted in the 
fundamental Armenian perception of Russia as protector, which reflects a natural affinity toward 
a Russian alliance.  This affinity for a pro-Russian orientation is due to both the legacies of the 
Armenian Genocide and from seven decades of Soviet rule.  But it is more than simply a legacy, 
however, as modern Armenia is increasingly concerned over the proximity of a contentious 
Turkey and Azerbaijan’s militant rhetoric.  But there are real limits to the net gains derived from 
Armenia's strategic partnership with Russia. Generally, the core limitation is rooted in the 
structural dependence of the relationship, as Armenia serves as less of a partner and more as a 
platform for Russia. An important factor contributing to this increasingly one-sided relationship 
has been a crucial mistake by Armenian leaders in underestimating Armenia’s strategic 
importance to Russia while, at the same time, overestimating Russia’s strategic significance to 
Armenia. While this imbalance has tended to distort the overall development of the country, it 
has also belittled and weakened Armenian independence and statehood. 
 
II. Armenia and the CSTO 
 
Unlike Georgia, Armenia has never sought to become a full member of the NATO alliance.  
Although Armenia is a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and maintains 
positive military ties with many countries of the West, including the US and Greece most 
notably, it also has military ties with China and an important place with the Russian-led 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  To date, Armenia has been very successful in 
maintaining this military balance, and its deployment of peacekeepers to both Iraq and Kosovo 
have never raised Russian doubts or concerns. 
 
The Creation of New “Collective Rapid Response Forces” 
 
For Armenian national security and military needs, the continued threats of war and sizable 
defense spending in Azerbaijan have driven Armenian defense planners to secure a stronger 
place within the CSTO.  In recent months, faced with the possibility for renewed war within a 
decade or so, Armenian officials have raised the alarm much more often.  From that perspective, 
Armenian officials welcomed the 4 February 2009 decision during the Moscow summit of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) -- a body to which Armenia belongs – to create 
new “Collective Rapid Response Forces,” aimed at becoming “an effective tool in providing 
security” within the CSTO, in the words of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. 
 
According to General Haik Kotanjian, the head of the Armenian Defense Ministry’s Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, the decision “creates a solid political, treaty-legal and military 
foundation” for the collective defense of CSTO members including Armenia.  According to 
Kotanjian, the new forces offer “a real mechanism of resisting aggression,” hinting at the threat 
from Azerbaijan. 
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For Nagorno Karabagh as well, which after Russia’s recognition of the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, is now the sole remaining “frozen” conflict in the 
region, the threats posed by a re-armed and re-assertive Azerbaijan can not be ignored.  For the 
time being at least, Karabagh remains fairly secure, mainly due to the impressive professionalism 
and high state of readiness of the Karabagh military, in contrast to the generally poor state of the 
Azerbaijani armed forces.  Most crucially, the tactical advantages of the Karabagh military’s 
well-entrenched defensive fortifications also deter Azerbaijani aggression in the medium-term.   
 
III. The Impact of the Georgian War on Armenia 
 
Even before the August 2008 war in Georgia, there were several dangerous trends in the region 
already evident.  These regional trends, ranging from a regional “arms race” to a shift in the 
fragile military balance of power in the region, posed new and very serious threats to Armenian 
national security. 
 
A Regional Arms Race 
 
For several years, there has been a marked increase in a regional competition over defense 
spending.  As Azerbaijan escalates its defense spending on a massive scale, Armenia is 
compelled to keep pace, fueling a new “arms race” in the region.  Over the medium term, the 
danger for Armenia is not simply to match Azerbaijan’s military spending and rearmament, but 
to prepare for a possible emergence of a much stronger Azerbaijani military.  In addition, there is 
a related worry over Azerbaijan’s militant rhetoric to “solve” the Nagorno Karabagh conflict by 
force has been bolstered by several years of billion-dollar-plus defense budgets.  That 
combination of militant rhetoric and military spending now poses one of the most serious threats 
to regional security and stability. 
 
The Delicate Balance of Power 
 
Obviously, the military balance of power in the region is changing.  The war in Georgia last 
August has weakened Georgian military capabilities, strengthened Russian military influence 
and has effectively ended the concept of NATO expansion in the South Caucasus.  But a deeper 
trend that was already underway well before the August conflict, as Azerbaijan seems poised to 
emerge as the dominant military actor in the region over the medium- to long-term.  And as 
demonstrated in Baku’s repeated threats to “solve” the Karabagh issue by force. Azerbaijan is 
clearly one of the most militarily ambitious of the former Soviet states, but also threatens to 
upset the delicate balance of power in the region. 
 
Azerbaijan’s Military Aspirations 
 
But the larger problem stems from Azerbaijan’s military aspirations, as Baku has repeatedly 
asserted a commitment to building a modern, self-sufficient armed forces on its own terms, 
rejecting the patronage of both NATO and Russia.  Yet the course of military reform in 
Azerbaijan has been particularly difficult in recent years and, despite a sharp increase in its 
annual defense budget financed by its energy wealth, the outlook for Azerbaijan’s rise as a 
regional power is far from certain. 
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Despite the benefits of three consecutive years of defense budgets of more than $1 billion, 
Azerbaijan has accomplished little to date in terms of procuring advanced weapons systems or 
investing in modern equipment.  Of its three branches of service, both the army and air force 
have continued to suffer from neglect, with continued shortages of spare parts and poor 
equipment maintenance.  In addition, the Azerbaijani Air Force continues to suffer from 
shortfalls in munitions, ordnance and even aviation fuel, making the service the least combat-
ready force within the Azerbaijani armed forces.  The Azerbaijani army, traditionally the core 
service of the armed forces, also lacks power projection capabilities and is far from attaining 
even a minimum level of combat-readiness.  
 
Thus, the real potential for building a modern armed forces in Azerbaijan remains little more 
than a distant promise at this stage.  And even with the enormous state budgets for defense, a 
relatively small proportion of defense spending has actually been spent on arms, training and 
essential equipment.  Moreover, although the future of Azerbaijan as a regional military power 
seems certain, it will require at least a decade of sustained and serious military reform before 
Azerbaijan can even begin to realize its potential as the dominant military power in the region. 
 
The Russian Role in the Region 
 
Within a context of an even stronger Russian position in the region, and even despite the tension 
in US-Russian relations, both Moscow and Washington remain committed to keeping the OSCE 
Minsk Group as the main and most important mechanism for the conflict mediation process.  In 
fact, both Russia and the US share a commitment to cooperate in mediating the Karabagh 
conflict: for Moscow the “status quo” is preferred and enhances Russia’s position, while for 
Washington, the process is necessary to prevent any Azerbaijani temptation to restart a war over 
Karabagh.  
 
But what is most troubling for regional security is the fact that Azerbaijan sees a different lesson 
from the recent conflict in Georgia.  Many in Azerbaijan see that the most serious Georgian 
mistake was not their decision to launch a military campaign to retake South Ossetia, but rather, 
Georgia’s strategic mistake was launching military operations before they were fully prepared or 
strong enough.  Thus, the Azerbaijani view of the lesson from the war in Georgian is that it is 
better for them to wait until they are strong enough and ready to wage war to retake Karabagh.   
 
IV. Addressing New Security Threats: Armenia’s Response 
 
We see that the traditional regional players in the region, Russia, Turkey and Iran, are now also 
competing for influence with the United States and the European Union. But the most significant 
factor for Armenia is not the role of outside players in the region, but the challenge of addressing 
Armenia’s unresolved domestic political crisis.  Without the foundation of resilient democracy, a 
population whose needs are met and an economy based on opportunity, Armenia will not be 
strong or stable enough to resist the outside influence of external actors.  In this way, Armenia 
needs to tackle these internal challenges in order to strengthen its own sovereignty and statehood.  
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As an arena for both cooperation and competition, the region is strategically significant, by 
virtue of its geographic and geopolitical vulnerability as a region where the national interests of 
Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States all converge.  Over the long-term, in order to acquire 
durable security in the South Caucasus, however, the real imperatives are internal in nature, 
stemming from several key challenges: the need to graduate from the political school of elections 
driven by power not politics, and for leaders to be elected, not simply selected. Legitimacy is the 
key determinant for durable security and stability, while the strategic reality of the region is 
defined less by geopolitics, and more by local politics and economics.  But most crucial is the 
lesson that institutions matter more than individuals for real democratization.  
 
For Armenia, there seems to be a dangerous lack of appreciation of these trends, however, and 
more seriously, is compounded by an incomplete Armenian strategy for national security, only 
matched by a lack of a coherent process of national security.  Specifically, the course of 
Armenian national security has failed to evolve beyond the parameters of the Karabagh conflict 
and has only led to a hardening of Armenian political thinking in recent years, fostering an 
increasingly rigid nationalist posture, a closed system of politics and limited political discourse.   
 
But it is also the absence of the process more than the policy of national security that is most 
worrisome.  One of the most glaring deficiencies is demonstrated by the current lack of an 
institutionalized national security.  The first problem is structural, as the Armenian National 
Security Council is rarely convened as a full consultative body and, even when it meets, is 
usually focused on the implementation, rather than the formulation, of decisions.  
 
Thus, the redefinition of Armenian national security reveals the need for not only for a clear and 
coherent redefinition national security, but for a new recognition of national security as a 
dynamic, not static, process beyond policy.  But the imperative for overcoming Armenia’s 
national insecurity is to first address the underlying military, political and economic trends.  The 
overwhelming focus on so-called external threats to Armenian national security has been both 
misplaced and mistaken.  Such “threat misperception” is rooted in a rigid nationalism has been 
compounded by the closed and subjective nature of national security and defense policy-making.   
 
The overwhelming need, therefore, is to institute a process of national security and defense that 
elevates Armenia’s true national interests over more parochial partisan interests and that 
recognizes that the core challenges to Armenian national security come not from Turkey or even 
Azerbaijan, but from within.  Only then, can Armenia attain real security and lasting stability.   
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